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This paper discusses scientiﬁc, social and technological aspects of memory. Recent
developments in our understanding of memory processes and mechanisms, and their digital
implementation, have placed the encoding, storage, management and retrieval of
information at the forefront of several ﬁelds of research. At the same time, the divisions
between the biological, physical and the digital worlds seem to be dissolving. Hence,
opportunities for interdisciplinary research into memory are being created, between the life
sciences, social sciences and physical sciences. Such research may beneﬁt from immediate
application into information management technology as a testbed. The paper describes one
initiative, memories for life, as a potential common problem space for the various interested
disciplines.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Theinterfacebetweenthephysicalworldandthedigital
world seems to be blurring, and becoming less determi-
nate (Abowd et al. 2002). It has long been recognized
that the interaction between technology and human
society can have far-reaching psychological effects (Ong
1982). Thinkers as early as Socrates and Plato focused
onmemoryasonefacultyofmindforwhichtechnologies
of storage could change individuals’ psychological
makeup, by, so to speak, externalizing or ‘outsourcing’
mental function. In recent years, the development of
such commonplace innovations as email, ubiquitous
computing (including the Internet), virtual reality and
advanced prosthetics have brought home the require-
ment for an increase in the scientiﬁc and social under-
standing of cognitive function, in order to design and
evaluate appropriate technological devices.
Memory is by no means the only relevant area for
interaction at the interface of the mind and the digital,
but it is a very exciting one, as evinced by the
impressive convergence evident from research reviews
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Cognitive
Systems Foresight programme (Morris et al. 2006b).
The ability to co-opt electronic media for the storage of
personally relevant information gives rise to the notion
of memories for life (M4L), currently being discussed as
a ‘grand challenge’ for computing (Fitzgibbon & Reiter
2003; Shadbolt 2003b), to deﬁne and solve the problems
caused by people storing increasingly large quantities of
information about themselves.
Memory for life is a research problem, and a problem
space—but what problem, and why now? The use of
electronic media for supporting human information
storage and recall needs deﬁnes an area. We have
always had artiﬁcial aids to memory of course; the
twenty-ﬁrst century twist is that suddenly we are
presented with the possibility of memories for life.
Paper survives, but not predictably. Our knowledge
of Ancient Egypt, for instance, stems partly from the
accidental survival of certain papyri from various
rubbish tips (cf. Hunt & Edgar 1932); we have no idea
whether these agreements, letters, wills, accounts and
charms are representative or not of social and business
life in Hellenistic Egypt. We can doubt whether the
Egyptiansthemselves,whoofcoursecareddeeplyabout
posterity, would have selected these papyri had they
been commissioned to set up a time capsule. But the use
of digital and electronic media moves information
storage on from paper; survival can now be managed.
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Accepted 17 March 2006 351 q 2006 The Royal SocietyIt is now possible to store digital versions of life’s
memories. As Alan Dix playfully noted, it takes
100 kbits s
K1 to get high-quality audio and video. If
we imagine someone with a camera strapped to his or
her head for 70 years (2.2!10
9 s), that is something of
the order of 27.5 terabytes of storage required, or about
four hundred and ﬁfty 60 GB iPods. And if Moore’s
Law continues to hold over those 70 years (admittedly a
large assumption!), it would be possible to store a
continuous record of a life on a grain of sand (Dix 2002).
Of course, memory storage is unlikely to be continu-
ousoveralifetime,butitcould bevery rich.The variety
of information captured varies between the home and
theworkplace,andrangesfromdocumentsandemailsto
digital photographs, video and so on. The ‘information
overload’ problem, long recognized in the computing
industry, is becoming a major issue in the workplace for
everyone and for the private citizen too, as retrieving
and selectively deleting (forgetting) these data become
ever more of a challenge. And the challenge is now
directly related to our conception of ourselves, as the
information we collect is increasingly generated by us,
not by outside observing bodies. The information will
have some sort of role in deﬁning our identities, over a
lifetime.
In this space, interdisciplinarity is crucial. The issues
of storage, retrieval and forgetting have analogies
across a range of sciences, and yet these analogies are
by no means fully understood. For instance, in
cognitive psychology, the problem of understanding
selective attention—the processing by which an abun-
dance of sensory information impinging upon us is
ﬁltered to enable a manageable ﬂow of information for
the brain to handle—has been studied for many years
(e.g. Broadbent 1958). But how many of the insights
that have come from this work have had an impact on
the design of operating systems used in desktop PCs?
A large number of disciplines may contribute to
M4L; in this paper, we focus on a small but central
subset of them. At a minimum, the M4L research
programme will require input from mechanistic studies
of the brain (neuroscience), the human mind (cognitive
psychology), the structures and limitations imposed by
human society and human social behaviour (sociology),
information technology (computer science) and man-
agement (knowledge management). Of course, this is
not an exhaustive list of relevant disciplines of those
who could contribute.
But how can we move from analogy and metaphor
(different ways of understanding ‘memory’) to concrete
two-way interaction between disciplines? M4L may or
may not end up as a recognized subdiscipline, but what
seems inevitable is that the various disciplines, all
looking at memory, understood differently, with differ-
ent methods and jargons, will move towards each other
as scientists begin to understand each other’s languages
and methodologies. The ﬁrst stage will be converging
understanding of the problem space (convergence of
language and method); a second stage will be learning
from results in different disciplines (for instance,
computing memory ‘borrowing’ structures from psy-
chology, such as working memory and long-term
memory). The third stage of interaction will be closing
feedback loops and genuinely collaborating. We are,
hopefully, well on the way to achieving stage one. And
the prizes for going beyond this stage are great.
Analogous to the switch from orality to literacy
centuries ago, the digital revolution gives rise to
momentous opportunities. For instance, the existence
of large quantities of multimedia information recorded
from a life may beneﬁt from research to integrate
information from distinct media to create a narrative of
events that may be of value to a person’s descendents.
Intelligent querying of large data stores, mapping of
deep structures in such stores and development of user
models are some examples of important technical
challenges that present themselves immediately, issues
being confronted by the research teams developing the
Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al. 2001). Analysing
stored information to model a person’s lifestyle (with
potential commercial implications in the insurance and
security industries), behaviour and health (the ‘virtual
general practitioner’), or intelligent Webpages that can
adapt themselves to a person’s linguistic and other
competence are examples of more ambitious appli-
cations that we might look forward to in the coming
decades. Developing prosthetic memories for those with
impaired cognitive function may seem too far fetched to
be worthy of discussion, yet projects with precisely this
in mind are currently underway.
Our aim here is to discuss recent progress in these
exemplar ﬁelds, and suggest how this disparate work
might be pulled together to address a common problem
space, which we might call the grand challenge of M4L.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a
brief review of the different disciplines’ conceptions of
memory, partly developed by theoreticians, partly as a
function of methodology (§2), including relatively
extended reviews of recent developments in the science
of human memory (§2.1), our understanding of memory
as a social construct, and as embedded in material
culture (§2.2), and developments in digital storage of
information (§2.3). As our conceptions of memory
evolve, various social issues become relevant. Section 3
examines the context of memory in digital form, and
reviews some of the issues following from the need to
transmit memories in other than haphazard ways, and
the perhaps unexpected difﬁculties there are in preser-
ving supposedly permanent digital memories for longer
than a few years. And when digital information is
preserved, transferable and, crucially, searchable, its
ethical handling become even more important; some of
the issues here are reviewed in §4.
Having reviewed the scientiﬁc, technological, social
and ethical context, we will then be in a position to
describe the grand challenge of M4L in more detail (§5),
setting out a technological challenge and showing how
it is amenable to an interdisciplinary response, before a
ﬁnal set of concluding remarks (§6).
2. CONCEPTIONS OF MEMORY
The term ‘memory’ is used in numerous ways and has
several technical deﬁnitions. In everyday discourse,
memory is generally used to refer to the act of bringing
to mind information that is retained from the past. We
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day, or that Paris is the capital of France. There are
important differences between these two instances of
memory, which we shall come to, but both are
propositional. Memory as an ‘act’ is commonly
distinguished from the mere execution of a learned
skill and, in this way, folk psychology embodies Ryle’s
(1949, pp. 26–60) distinction between knowing that
(propositional knowledge) and knowing how (skills)—a
distinction incorporated into artiﬁcial intelligence as
early as the discussions by the Dartmouth Conference
Group in the late 1950s. Were we to ask someone
whether they could remember how to ride a bicycle, we
would not be surprised if they replied ‘I don’t
know—let’s get out the bike and see’. Skills are not
propositional in the same way as declarative forms of
memory; they are forms of procedural knowledge that
are embedded into the behavioural expression systems
of which they are a part.
More technically, memory can refer to the mental
faculty of retaining information about stimuli of some
sort when those stimuli are no longer present. An
organism (or robot) that can do this is said to have ‘a
memory’. Second, it may refer to the contents of that
storage system rather than the system itself. This is
closer to its everyday usage—that phenomenological
sense of having a memory of something. Third, there is
the much broader reference to the family of processes
and underlying mechanisms that implement the var-
ious forms of memory, and different levels of analysis at
which these may be studied. Their study is the
substance of large areas of neuroscience and cognitive
psychology.
Is there a key logical concept that marks off memory
from other cognitive capacities, such as perception and
attention? The generally accepted view is that there is
in the case of long-term memory, which entails some
conjunction of recording events and the passage of time.
Speciﬁcally, something happens at time t1 that causes a
change in the organism, such that something else at
time t2 is inﬂuenced by the prior event at t1. What has
taken a long time to appreciate, an appreciation that is
a product of science in the twentieth century, is
recognition that this ‘inﬂuence’ can take many forms
(such as propositional versus procedural). One of the
challenges for the twenty-ﬁrst century is to understand
how these different forms of memory are implemented
and to use this burgeoning knowledge to develop
effective engineering devices that can emulate and
externalize these forms of memory to advantage. In
contrast, it is increasingly realized that attention and
perception are intimately concerned with a further form
of memory known as working memory, which is
concerned with the special function of maintaining
and transforming temporary information.
The disciplines that need to be brought together by
the M4L vision are inevitably inﬂuenced in their
interpretation of what memory might be by the
methodologies that accompany them. For instance,
neuropsychologists are now endeavouring to map
psychological processes onto neuroanatomical struc-
tures and networks using the analysis of selected
neurological patients, and both functional magnetic
resonance and other imaging techniques. Those at a
more ﬁne-grained level of analysis focus on the
biochemical pathways that mediate changes at the
level of the neuron and its sub-cellular components,
including the synapse (Ahmed et al. 2006; Morris et al.
2006a). The logical concept of memory entails that it
should be detectable by some change in a brain state
that is doing the storage (although in practice, this may
prove very difﬁcult to identify—the so-called ‘needle in
a haystack’ problem). One focus in the neuroscience of
memory is on investigating what such states might be,
with the strength of synaptic connections between
neurons being very important here (Martin & Morris
2002; LeDoux 2002). Another interdisciplinary focus is
the use of computer modelling to implement biologi-
cally realistic models of synaptic modiﬁcation and
topological rearrangementi ns y n t h e t i cn e r v o u s
systems (Elliott & Shadbolt 2003).
The investigation of networks of neurons is complex
enough requiring technology ranging from multiphoton
confocal microscopy to image living synapses through
to ensemble single-unit recording to get a handle on
neuronal networks. On top of that, there are also
questions about brain development, of how the brain is
shaped by genetic instruction, of how the environment
has its effect. This inevitable focus on these complex
systems has meant that neuroscientists have, until
recently, worked with a highly individualistic con-
ception of the person, where the environment is
encoded largely through sensory inputs, and systems
are small networks of neurons that can store or retrieve
information (cf. LeDoux 2002, pp. 31–32). This
perspective is changing with new research programmes
focusing on the cognitive neuroscience of social
interactions between people, concerned with how
higher-level mental functions are implemented in the
brain (Blakemore & Decety 2001). It builds on the early
success of cognitive neuropsychology in accounting for
cognitive impairments resulting from brain damage or
disease, but goes further to investigate the neural basis
of cognition in the healthy brain using new technol-
ogies, such as functional neuroimaging (Posner &
DiGirolamo 2000).
Areas such as knowledge management, in effect,
treat organizations as relatively determinate structures
embodying processes of knowledge production,
manipulation, retrieval or storage (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995, pp. 56–94). Corporate memory is therefore the
focus of information retrieval strategies (Brooking
1998), and memory is then seen as the capacity of an
organization to generate the key information for its
information processing without acquiring it afresh.
A corporate memory is therefore likely to be hetero-
geneous in form, taking in paper-based resources,
computer ﬁles and actual memory or know-how in
people’s heads (Douglas 1987). It will also be closely
associated with a corporate context, which may or may
not be explicitly modelled (O’Hara & Shadbolt 1997;
Schreiber et al. 2000, pp. 25–67). Pressing issues are the
organization of the corporate memory, its represen-
tation and its retrieval (both in terms of how to ﬁsh the
right information out of the repository, and of which
repository to search in). An issue, then, that
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concerns, is the extent to which technology can and
should be applied. Projects such as Advanced Knowl-
edge Technologies (AKT 2001—http://www.aktors.
org) seek to discover ways of exploiting new technol-
ogies, such as the Semantic Web, to ease the creation
and transfer of knowledge through its organizational
life cycle (Shadbolt et al. 2004a,b).
Sociology differs by having a much less functional
view of the surrounding environment. Hence, the work-
ings of social memory become relatively difﬁcult to
uncover against what is in effect a highly indeterminate
backdrop. Memory has been seen as a dialogue between
present and past, as the past has to some extent to be
articulatedinorderforitseffectstobeseeninthepresent
(Huyssen 1995). That articulation of the past may be
expressly in order to remember, to see the past as past
(as with various mechanisms, such as commemorative
artefacts like statues, storytelling practices, photo-
graphs or texts); or may be involved in the reproduction
of useful performance in the present, inscribing the past
in the present as present (as with habit or other
repetitious learned behaviour, known in sociological
theoryashabitus;Bourdieu1977).Sharedmemoriesalso
have a quasi-subjective property, which implies a
contrasting methodology from that used; for example,
to investigate more objective evidence in history,
although drawing the dividing lines here is non-trivial
(Misztal 2003, pp. 99–108).
Meanwhile, computing focuses on the provision of
information storage capacity. Here, the attention
includes keeping costs low and reliability up. There is
much less interest in the quality of the knowledge that
is being recalled, this being the responsibility of the
user. Research bifurcates between the development of
hardware and software. What has drawn the eye in
recent years is the continuing relevance of Moore’s Law,
that storage capacity and computing power of chips
have doubled every 18 months and will continue to do
so, which has endured remarkably ever since Moore
made his observation in 1965. In pursuit of this aim,
engineering researchers are currently examining new
types of hardware, as the limits of the standard silicon
chips are in sight. Fast non-volatile memory is
beginning to appear on so-called magnetic RAM,
chalcogenides that change shape when an electrical
charge is applied to them and carbon nanotubes.
However, as the amounts of information being stored
continue to increase exponentially, the requirement for
sensible and intuitive organization methods to facilitate
retrieval becomes ever heavier. Such retrieval methods
may simply involve advanced knowledge-based reason-
ing, but may also include neurobiologically inspired
methods, such as content-based retrieval. As with
neuroscience, the methodological decision here will
have a strong effect on which other disciplines it will be
easier to integrate this work with (O’Hara et al. 2006).
The growing subﬁeld of nature-inspired computing
(Shadbolt 2004a) involves the harnessing of processes
(or analogues of processes) found in the natural world,
such as phylogeny, ontogeny and epigenesis, to discover
biologically realistic methods of processing information
that are very different from the computational
architectures; they can implement very high-level
operations without top-down planning. From the
early days of nature-inspired computing, situated,
embodied agents were being built which exploited
features of the environment to support information
processing (e.g. by not storing information, but using
sensors to rediscover it anew). In effect, the environ-
ment acted as the memory of such agents (Steels &
Brooks 1995).
Computational modelling of memory processes has
been discussed as a potential area that could work to
help bring theoretical accounts of memory together
(Morris et al. 2006a). For instance, nature-inspired
computing, network computing and neuroinformatics
could all play a role in bringing together diverse
researchers to try to understand aspects of brain
function. The argument of this paper is that M4L, as
a cluster of research projects, will help dissolve certain
communication and comprehension problems between
researchers into the brain, human psychology, society
and the digital sharing and archiving of information
about the past.
Finally, we must not forget an important part of
memory—forgetting (Schacter 2001). The loss of stored
information is again conceived very differently across
the disciplines. In the human sciences, forgetting—
though sometimes a dysfunction—is often a boon, a
form of mental housekeeping that usefully gets rid of
information that is out of date, unlikely to be required,
or traumatic. Schacter argues that forgetting is an
inevitable consequence of a mental system that
ordinarily works very well and that the various
manifestations of ‘normal’ forgetting are extremely
useful tools for researchers that are studying how the
biological system is organized. Still, forgetting can be
troublesome, such as when one forgets the name of
someone one has met the day before; or even debilitat-
ing to a point where a person’s capacity to live
independently is compromised. On the other hand, in
computing, forgetting is almost always a failure of one
sort or another; information once stored on a hard disc
should stay there. Knowledge management stands
somewhere in between, with the added wrinkle that
forgetting can sometimes be anticipated (e.g. when an
expert decides to leave the ﬁrm, or retire), and it may
then be an economic decision whether to bribe the
expert to stay, to employ a new person and perhaps
even ensure some overlap between the contracts of the
new and the old, or to engage in some other knowledge
acquisition exercise (Cowan et al. 1999). In sociology,
the forgetting of aspects of the past strongly affects the
political myths in a society, and so the investigation of
forgetting is connected with power structures, and who
is able to drive social memories underground (O’Hara &
Stevens 2006). Socially and politically, forgetting
stands alongside forgiving; it may be the latter option
that strikes the better balance between avoiding
present-day conﬂict while respecting those who have
suffered in the past (Margalit 2002).
While we do not discuss forgetting in detail in this
paper, for reasons of space, we recognize that it is a very
important issue in the context of M4L. Two research
questions immediately leap to mind guided by the
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almost the opposite, emulating the failings of human
memory in technology in pursuit of devices that are
more user-friendly. First, can technology reliably be
harnessed to lower the burdens of memory on the
human subject, by greater externalization of
the information we need from memory in our daily
lives? As we move from the ‘yellow pages’ of the
Gutenberg world to the Google of the twenty-ﬁrst
century, carrying with us the permanently connected
PDAs of our personal digital environments, Morris
et al. (2006a) have already been moved to wonder, as
Socrates did in Plato’s Phaedrus, whether ‘the need for
an endogenous memory [will] become a thing of the
past’. This is unlikely, although many are already in the
workplace not bothering to ﬁle information that is
better accessed anew through Web searches (e.g. airline
timetables). Conversely, confronting the assumption in
computer science that forgetting is always a ‘bad thing’,
Morris et al. (2006a) have also wondered whether
certain forms of software should not more explicitly
emulate the patterns of forgetting of the human mind.
That is, given constraints on the techniques of
intelligent search, and requirements for the trust-
worthiness of large heterogeneous data stores such as
the World Wide Web, should forgetting techniques be
imported into computer science as well? And in
particular, should such techniques be biologically
inspired (O’Hara et al. 2006)?
Our argument so far has been that integrating the
various disciplines relevant for ventures such as M4L
will be a formidable task. But the advantage of the M4L
challenge is that it does provide the functional
centripetal force of a common problem space. We now
offer a brief survey of the relevant disciplines, to show
where discoveries and progress are being made that will
help address the problems of M4L, and incidentally to
demonstrate where integration is being achieved
already. The surveys here are of necessity highly
selective, and show only a fraction of the relevant
work in the various ﬁelds.
2.1. Psychological and neural conceptions of
memory
Very impressive synergies have been revealed by the
intersection of experimental psychology and neuro-
science with respect to studies of human memory. A key
and very inﬂuential discovery is that there is no single
memory system in the mind, no device which does all
the work of what we call ‘memory’. Humans (and
animals) have multiple memory systems—distinct
systems for processing, storing and retrieving infor-
mation of different kinds that integrate smoothly
enough to give the illusion of a single faculty. We also
have an array of memory processes, such as encoding
and retrieval, and these reﬂect different brain states
and, with these, different states of mind.
Various psychological taxonomies of the multiple
types of memory exist. All of these divide memory with
respect to both capacity and persistence, with short-
term or ‘working-memory’ systems having limited
capacity and persistence but high-ﬁdelity, serving as a
central workspace for bringing together and transform-
ing information from other memory systems, closely
linked to attention. In contrast, long-term memory
serves as the ultimate repository, mainly passive, of
vast quantities of propositional information and
skills. Long-term memory has, for example, been
taxonomically divided by Tulving (2002) into percep-
tual–representational systems, semantic memory, epi-
sodic memory and procedural skills. This classiﬁcation
fares reasonably well, but is not without its problems
(Morris et al. 2006a). An important omission relates to
emotional or ‘value’ memory, in which speciﬁc stimuli
may evoke feelings of pleasure or sadness. Another
important distinction to bear in mind is that between
implicit and explicit memory. Only the latter involves
active conscious awareness of the contents of the
memory system. Implicit memory, in contrast, can
still be propositional, but is unavailable to conscious
awareness—a distinction that is difﬁcult to grasp, but
will prove very important in the engineering of new
memory devices.
The neuroscience dimension comes in at numerous
levels, as already noted. The active memory system
that we use for manipulating and ‘working on’ verbal
and visuo-spatial information—Baddeley’s (1992)
working memory—involves sub-systems that are now
thought to be located in speciﬁc parts of the brain.
Brain imaging studies have revealed that some of these
are located in the frontal lobe, others in posterior
regions, and that they interconnect in a network-like
manner as a function of the task being performed
(Fletcher & Henson 2001). The perceptual–representa-
tional components of long-term memory are presumed
to be intrinsic to the sensory–perceptual components of
the various sensory systems, and include front-end
modules for identifying colour and motion, specialized
modules, such as the face-processing system of the
superior temporal gyrus (Perrett et al. 1992, 1998) and
the fascinating mirror-neuron system of the parietal
lobe (Rizzolatti et al. 2001); mirror-neurons being a set
of neurons that simultaneously encode actions (e.g. a
monkey grasping an object) and the watching of actions
(e.g. a monkey watching another monkey grasping an
object). Semantic and episodic memory are both
thought to involve numerous cortical modules as well,
and there is currently much discussion about the
speciﬁc role of the hippocampus of the medial temporal
lobe in the formation and consolidation of new episodic
memories. Some hold that the hippocampus is equally
involved in the formation of all declarative memories,
episodic and semantic (e.g. Bayley & Squire 2003),
while others believe the cortex alone is capable of
encoding and storing new semantic information, but
requires the spatio-temporal contextual information
provided by the hippocampus for new episodic
encoding.
As discussed by Morris et al. (2006a), other levels of
analysis in the neurosciences take the study of memory
beyond the level of ‘where in the brain’ to the study of
the physiological patterns of activity required for new
memory encoding, consolidation or retrieval; thence to
the sub-cellular sites at which physical changes happen
in the neurons, particularly alterations in synaptic
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transduction pathways and genes, whose protein
products are essential for normal memory function in
diverse circuits. One contentious issue is whether the
cellular mechanisms of neuronal and synaptic plasticity
have long been conserved, such that the mechanisms in
the human brain are little different to those expressed in
the lowliest sea-slug, such as Aplysia. If true, this idea
has a beautiful simplicity about it, for it implies that
there are only a few underlying mechanisms by which
neurons can alter their connectivity (e.g. pre- and
postsynaptic mechanisms). It also implies that these
evolved early and that they have been re-used, like
letters of the alphabet, in newly evolved circuits of the
vertebrate brain that enable more complex forms of
information processing. The alternative is to suppose
that evolution is more likely to operate at all levels,
with certain connectional mechanisms re-used to be
sure, but new ones developed at the gene, protein,
signal-transduction pathway, synapse, cellular and
circuit level.
From the perspective of M4L, all of these distinct
forms of memory are relevant to the development of
novel computational software that might be used for
organizing and storing information about a person’s life
in a manner that would later be accessible. We shall
highlight two topics that have been extensively studied
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, respectively,
that are likely to be relevant to workers in other
disciplines: (i) the distinction between semantic and
episodic memory and (ii) the problem of memory
consolidation.
Semantic memory refers to the storehouse of facts
that we know about the world—such as our knowledge
that Paris is the capital of France. Episodic memory, in
contrast, involves memory for individual events, with
the act of remembering involving mental time travel to
the time and place where this event happened in one’s
mind’s eye (a capacity that some suspect to be uniquely
human; Tulving 2002). A neuropsychological patient
who knew that he or she was married but was unable to
remember anything about where or when this event
happened, or who was there at the time, would be said
to be suffering from a (severe) deﬁcit in episodic but not
semantic memory. The importance of this distinction
for M4L is that computing software designers will need
to take on board that the human memory operates
seamlessly with these two forms of memory for a very
important reason. Put simply, to operate effectively,
the system needs to forget all the spatio-temporal tags
of episodic events that accompany information that
gradually ﬁnds its way into semantic memory if
memory is not to be incapacitated by handling a large
volume of irrelevant information. It may be interesting
to remember one’s ﬁrst visit to Paris, or the person with
whom one walked hand-in-hand down the banks of the
Seine, but the issue at hand in a busy life is very rarely
going to require this additional information when all
that matters for the decision to be taken is knowingthat
Paris is the capital of France. The same issue arises as
children acquire general knowledge as they grow up and
go through the educational system. So far so good. The
scientiﬁc problem is how does one best go about
constructing semantic networks? How does the brain
do it? And why are we typically unable to recall
episodic memories from the very earliest years of our
life? Might this ‘infantile amnesia’ be an adaptive
feature of the human memory system? These are topics
of widespread interest with efforts ranging from
experimental studies through to computational model-
ling. And how might we go about doing it on the Web?
In sharp contrast to the mental reﬂex of certain
computer scientists that forgetting is a ‘bad thing’,
the message from psychology and neuroscience is that
forgetting is vital for effective function. The decreasing
cost of silicon memory devices could be leading
computer scientists down an unwise path.
The problem of memory consolidation is a parallel
problem. Consolidation refers to the acquisition by
memory traces of some measure of permanence.
Information may get into long-term memory and be
stored effectively, such that a person can recall relevant
information the next day—well beyond the domain of
working memory—but it may not last. Either the
memory traces themselves do not last, or the associ-
ations may be insufﬁciently connected to other infor-
mation in memory to be readily accessible. The process
that enables recently formed long-term memories to
last is generally referred to as ‘memory consolidation’
and it is thought to be a selective process. In part,
memory consolidation is one of those topics in
neuroscience that could be said to fall into the ‘merely
interesting’ category, in that a current focus in brain
science is on the speciﬁc signal-transduction pathways
that neurons use to ensure the permanence of the
physical traces that mediate memory. However, there is
a growing body of evidence to suggest that the
physiological basis of long-term memory has impli-
cations for higher levels of analysis that other dis-
ciplines may wish to take on board. Speciﬁcally,
physiological studies indicate that some information
seems to enter long-term memory automatically, but
whether it is retained depends upon whether that
information is subsequently subject to consolidation.
This is a useful trick for the nervous system to have,
because the ‘decision’ about whether to retain or lose
information (effectively forever) need not be taken at
the moment the remembered event itself actually
happens. It can be temporally discontiguous with the
encoding operation. Events may be happening too
quickly for the consolidation mechanisms to keep up,
other later events may occur that render earlier
information important, irrelevant or misleading, it
may be valuable to wait until the body is in a state of
quiescence (e.g. sleep), and so on. Here again, it may be
possible in a digital device to make very fast ‘decisions’
about storage and to interleave new information with
old so quickly that this apparent design fault of the
human brain is ﬁnessed by superior silicon technology.
However, while time waits for no man, computers must
wait for time. It is very often the unfolding events of the
day that determine what earlier information is worth
retaining, and the interleaving process for storing
information can also be one that necessarily involves
re-activating memories and then integrating new
information on the basis of some conceptual reasoning
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Anderson (1993) has argued, the neural processes
underlying memory are adapted to the statistical
properties of the environment. It is unlikely that these
processes can be speeded up much faster than the
human mind—they need to run in real time. M4L
scenarios are very likely to involve the development of
software that knows about the circadian cycle of the
human day and uses this knowledge in interesting and
novel ways.
2.2. Social and material memory
Memory is increasingly under examination in the social
sciences and humanities, where, analogous to the study
of the memory of the human individual, the main foci
are the functions that are performed by social memory,
and the (physical and institutional) mechanisms that
underlie those functions (Misztal 2003). The functional
connections between social memory and wider social
and political processes can be very far-reaching; so
much is in agreement. However, it is equally true to say
that there is considerable disagreement over how ‘social
memory’ or ‘collective memory’ should be character-
ized, which makes the area particularly attractive for
interdisciplinary study. Some issues pertaining to social
memory include the following.
(i) Commemorative activities. Changes in politics,
for example the move from party- or ideology-
based politics to identity politics, in the late
twentieth century has put the issue of memory
centre-stage; for example, in the creation of
myths of success or martyrdom of ethnic groups,
of heroes in struggles (e.g. the suffragettes), and
so on (Ashplant et al. 2000). Some thinkers have
worried that the creation of such traditions is
governed largely by relatively powerful interest
groups (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983); one hope of
the M4L process is that such processes may be
democratized by sufﬁciently powerful technol-
ogy (O’Hara & Stevens 2006).
(ii) Identity. Following John Locke, a strong tra-
dition in philosophy has focused on memory as a
major constituent of identity (Warnock 1987);
similarly, there is a strong link drawn in
cognitive psychology between identity and
autobiographical memory. Much of the M4L
proposal (Fitzgibbon & Reiter 2003) looks at the
cementing of the ability of individuals to
construct narratives of their past out of diverse
materials (and also, since these records have a
persistence that other materials for memory do
not, to avoid mythmaking). Such narratives,
backed by technology, could have very strong
effects in the development of group identities,
which often have been seen as important in
resistance of communities to political or econ-
omic pressure (Castells 1997).
(iii) Trauma. Trauma, via the process of forgetting
explored in early psychoanalysis, has long been
an important object of study in social science.
On the scale of a society, organized forgetting
and positive distortion of the past have often
been a response to a traumatic history (Paez
et al. 1997), although many others have been
sceptical about the extension of the psycholana-
lytic metaphor to a society as a whole (Margalit
2002, pp. 4–6). Trauma theories have a linear
historical model of temporality which may help
bring social memory and history closer together
(Radstone 2000). Given that the materials that
the M4L programme would be bringing to the
study of memory are equally suited to the
creation of history as the fashioning of memory,
it is possible that M4L could continue that
process of rapprochement.I np a r t i c u l a r ,a n
interesting topic would be the discovery of social
analogues of psychogenic versus organic amne-
sia, and using this sort of metaphor to investi-
gate possibilities of ‘treatment’.
(iv) Conﬂict. It perhaps goes without saying that
memories of past evils, and their conceptualiz-
ation, are the starting point for many of today’s
conﬂicts. To take only the most prominent
present-day example, the grievances behind al-
Qaeda’s assault on Western liberalism are, to
judgebytheirownstatements,motivatedless by
modern-day conﬂicts in places such as Palestine,
Chechnya and Iraq, controversial as they may
be, and more by the defeat of the Moors by the
Christians in Spain in 1492 (Roy 2004). Fur-
thermore, the Spanish name for this event, the
reconquista, or reconquest is an interesting
example of a loaded choice of term. Actually,
the Visigoths themselves invaded Spain under
Theodoric II in 456AD, and suffered their ﬁrst
defeat by the Arabs under Roderic in 711AD
(Collins 1983). The Arabs’ 700 odd years in
Spain were a much longer span than the
Visigoths they defeated, and indeed more than
the intervening period since the reconquista,
even though the term ‘reconquista’ makes the
Moorish period seem like a small inconvenient
episode.
(v) Justice. The discussion of memory and justice is
important mood music behind debates such as
that over globalization, as ﬁrst world and
developing countries struggle to deal with the
legacy of the colonial era. Germany has made
serious attempts to address its totalitarian and
genocidal past (Habermas 1997; McAdams
2001), as has South Africa (Krog 1998). There
will need to be similar attempts in years to come,
for example in the former Yugoslavia; there will
certainly be plenty of materials (news footage,
videodiaries) forfashioningmemories ofthecivil
wars that simultaneously give voice to margin-
alized communities without demonizing former
aggressors.
(vi) Transhumanism. It has long been noticed by
philosophical and cultural critics that the
increasing exploitation of technology by humans
could well have important and far-reaching
effects on human nature itself; indeed, concerns
such as this date back at least as far as Socrates
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been hotly debated, optimists including the
feminist Donna Haraway (1985) and the compu-
ter scientist Kevin Warwick (2002), pessimists
including post-modernists, such as Lyotard
(1988/1991), neuroscientist Susan Greenﬁeld
(2003) and political scientist Francis Fukuyama
(2002).
In addition to social memory, the study of material
culture and how individuals utilize physical artefacts as
memory aids also has considerable relevance to those
interested in developing digital memory and for the
computing science challenges of M4L.
For centuries, individuals have used physical arte-
facts as external memory and reference aids. Over time,
these have ranged from personal journals and corre-
spondence, to photographs and photographic albums,
to whole personal libraries of books, serials, clippings
and off-prints. Annotation of these items and organiz-
ation of personal workspace to house them can provide
factual and emotive references, such as date, place,
context and personal meaning or signiﬁcance. Existing
practice in annotation (Marshall 1998) or organization
of workspace (Henderson 2004) are often not well
supported in digital environments and there is much we
can learn from their study in developing information
management practices for digital memory and personal
collections.
These personal collections and memory aids are
often of intense importance to individuals, their
descendents, and sometimes to a wider society. They
have often been the foundation or a core component of
museum, library and archive collections, and of the
cultural record. Their study therefore has been an
important component of traditional archive, library
and information science. As we move from externally
supported memory based on physical artefacts to a
hybrid digital and physical environment, and then
increasingly shift towards a digital memory for life,
many new research issues arise around personal
collections, personal libraries and information manage-
ment (Beagrie 2005). These include how to physically
secure such material sometimes over decades; how to
protect privacy; how to organize and extract infor-
mation and to use it effectively; and for material
intended to be shared, how to effectively present and
control access by different groups of users.
2.3. Digital memory
Computer memory is now so cheap that there appear to
be few limits to the amount of information—and
therefore the imperative to rationalize that informa-
tion—that can be stored. The need to develop computer
systems whose storage will encompass such quantities
of time is increasing as societies continue to develop a
proliﬁc and promiscuous attitude towards information.
For instance, proposals for identity cards will require,
inter alia, databases that remain extant for the
maximum human lifetime, something in excess of a
century—in other words twice as long as the entire
history of electronic computing. The issues with regard
to, for example, representational formats (which
generally change every few years) are major ones.
Many aspects of computer science will impinge upon
the M4L challenge, including databases, artiﬁcial
intelligence, human–computer interaction and operat-
ing systems. Security will be an issue of increasing
importance (Schneider 1999). One area of growing
importance, both with regard to computing issues and
also knowledge management issues, is that of knowledge
technologies (Shadbolt et al.2 0 0 4 a,b). Knowledge
technologies are systems intended to manipulate
knowledge through its life cycle, from acquisition,
through retrieval and publishing, to the essential
maintenance of knowledge repositories. Hence, knowl-
edge is information that can be put to use, for example,
can be fed into a problem-solving process, or can be
extracted from large stores of unstructured data.
Hence, knowledge technologies include: ontologies,
shared conceptualizations of domains that facilitate
communication between people, agents or systems
about those domains (Gruber 1993; Fensel 2003);
systems for enabling or automating the annotation of
knowledge sources, such metadata allowing reasoning
about knowledge sources to take place (Vargas-Vera
et al. 2002; Handschuh et al. 2002); human language
technologies, which enable structured knowledge to be
extracted from unstructured text, or alternatively
readable text to be created from machine- but not
human-readable information resources (Cunningham
et al. 2002; Ciravegna & Wilks 2003); and systems that
enable information to be transferred around an
organization, for instance capturing knowledge (and
its context) generated in meetings, in order to
distribute it to other stakeholders (Buckingham Shum
et al. 2002; Eisenstadt & Dzbor 2002; Tate et al. 2002).
Such technologies often build on the extra intelli-
gence capabilities generated by the Semantic Web, seen
as a potential successor to the World Wide Web
(Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Fensel et al. 2003). Given such
a Web environment, individuals would have access to
stores of knowledge with a wide range of Web services
processing such content (Shadbolt et al.2 0 0 4 b),
accessed through intelligent brokers (Motta et al.
2003).
The WWW provides a number of opportunities for
technologies relevant to the M4L area. For instance, the
links on the current WWW are provided by the author
of the page; this gives a type of associative linking from
one page to the next, but the person in charge of the
associations is the author, not the reader. Compare the
famous scene in Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past,
in which the narrator, upon eating a coconut madeleine
dipped in tea is immediately reminded of boyhood visits
to his Aunt Le ´onie in Combray where he used to have
the same treat. The associative links provided by the
WWW in its current form are different; if we draw an
analogy with Proust, the current WWW acts as if one
eats a cake and then proceeds to have the memories of
the baker! Hence, there is a great deal of research being
carried out into the provision of links by the reader’s
own system, based on a user model of the reader (Hall
2000).
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For instance, in a neural net, the pattern of the unit’s
activationstoresthedata.Hence,amemory,whichmay
have a number of attributes, is stored as a pattern of
activations. The memory, unlike many symbolic
systems, is not stored in an index system; it can, in
fact, be retrieved by using any of the attributes of the
memory as retrieval keys. Memory of this type is called
contentaddressablememory,andhasmanyadvantages;
not only ﬂexibility of recall, but also the ability to work
round corrupt data (e.g. Hodge & Austin 2001). An
interesting open question here is how to store symbolic
data in such a way as to support associative recall, in
other words, so that it can be retrievable through its
attributes (Gardenfors 2000; O’Hara et al. 2006).
A related issue is that of multimedia storage and
retrieval. Search and retrieval of text is relatively
straightforward, but without textual cues, other media
present problems of framing queries, organization of
memory stores, etc. Textual annotations may be added
to video or graphics, say, but such annotations can
never cover the full range of associations possible with a
picture; added to which, having to annotate presents
the user with a tedious overhead of effort.
There are many issues to be resolved here. For
instance, there are different storage requirements (e.g.
with respect to capacity) with dense media, such as
video or audio. Searchable hierarchical structures
provide one method of cutting the size of search spaces.
But such structures must also support a number of
other functions; for example, hypermedia systems need
models able to support the complex real-time selection,
retrieval and display of heterogeneous sources.
Over time, we can also expect the development of
new media types, such as haptic representations
(touch) or olfactory ones—computer systems are well
on the road to a full range of sensory input capabilities.
Integrating media types across different modalities,
understanding how to index, retrieve and integrate
information that originate in heterogeneous modalities,
will be a central research challenge for the next 20
years. One possible method for this could be derived
from multiresolution modelling, i.e. developing models
that operate at many different levels of abstraction
which can be reconstructed on demand (O’Hara et al.
2006).
Finally, as we saw in §2.1, human memory is actually
made up of several different specialist systems. Inte-
gration between human and digital memory could be
facilitated via an understanding of digital memory in
these terms. For example, does having a limited
capacity working memory impose useful constraints
on the management of large amounts of permanent
information? Does having separate but interlinked
memory systems for verbal and visuo-spatial infor-
mation suggest a useful way of organizing digitally
coded language and images? Does consolidation pro-
vide a fruitful model for how irrelevant information gets
removed (or ignored), and can the formation of
semantic networks from episodic memories provide
clues as to how ‘irrelevant’ is deﬁned relative to
context? How do we characterize and select the focus
of attention (Oberauer 2002; O’Hara et al. 2006)?
3. TRANSMISSION AND LONGEVITY OF
MEMORY
Digital memory over a human lifetime or beyond will
require persistence and accessibility over many decades
and transmission of that memory over many gener-
ations of hardware and software. This is by no means
a trivial concern and involves organizational, legal and
technical challenges.
It will not be possible to rely on the benign neglect or
accidental survival, which has often been a signiﬁcant
factor in transmission of material memory. In the right
conditions, papyrus or paper can survive by accident
for centuries or in the case of the Dead Sea Scrolls for
thousands of years. It takes hundreds of years for
languages and handwriting to evolve to the point where
only a few specialists can read them.
Incontrast,digitalinformationwillneversurviveand
remain accessible byaccident: itrequires ongoingactive
management (Beagrie & Jones 2001). The information
and the ability to read it can be lost in a few years.
Storage media such as paper tape, ﬂoppy disks, CD-
ROM, DVD evolve and fall out of use rapidly. Digital
storage media have relatively short archival lifespans
compared to other media. Research on digital data loss
hassuggestedthatasubstantialamountofpersonaldata
isnotbackedupandthat,onaverage,whilelessthan2%
of desktops are likely to experience an episode of data
loss each year, the corresponding rate for laptops is
greaterthan10%becauseofthehigherincidenceoftheft
(Smith 2003). For any memory collection intended for
access and use over a decade or more, the incremental




possible development to achieve this may be an
increasing move towards information being held in
online managed services, with personal devices acting
solely as access points.
The experience of archives, libraries and museums
(often referred to as ‘memory institutions’ because of
their role in social and cultural memory) could enrich
and interact with computing science research on M4L
and the development of memory systems for individ-
uals. In particular, research on digital preservation (the
long-term preservation and accessibility of digital
information) in these domains will be relevant to
persistence and transmission of digital memory. In the
mass consumer market, current interests in family
history may drive interest in transmission of memories
held in personal digital collections. In academic
research, these personal histories will also be of interest,
but it is suggested that the personal digital collections
of leading creative writers and artists, politicians and
scientists may ﬁrst engage research libraries and
archives in this area (Beagrie 2005).
Digital systems are currently poorly adapted to what
might be called individuals’ discontinuity of interest.
There is a focus on the immediate needs of users and
little in the way of digital equivalents of physical
storage spaces, in which material can be laid down
and later re-discovered, forgotten or discarded. Some
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dormant over time. For example, in family history, one
of the largest and most rapidly growing personal
pastimes, use of personal collections and material may
lie dormant for many decades. Individuals with no
interest in historic material or potential future appli-
cations early in life are highly likely to be interested in
them at a later stage of their lives.
4. TRUST, ETHICS, IDENTITY AND
FORGETTING
The creation of large, long-lived stores of information,
the development of techniques for efﬁcient searching of
them and the potential for wide access to these stores
together raise the obvious problem of trust (Shadbolt
2003a). As Reiter noted in a magazine interview, we
need to protect privacy when information about one
person is featured in another’s memories. How would
we treat the claims, often legitimate, to that infor-
mation from the police or security services (New
Scientist 2003)?
Trust issues are already pressing where new tech-
nologies are enabling new spaces for interaction; for
example, on the Internet, there is already an imperative
to ensure that information is accurate and properly
curated (O’Hara 2004, pp. 112–118). Work is beginning
on the creation of trust mechanisms for Internet
systems, and trust, it is fair to say, is a hot topic in
Internet circles (O’Hara & Shadbolt 2005). In particu-
lar, relatively little is known about trust as a second-
order property, whether it should be placed rationally,
and what the trade-off is with security (O’Hara 2005).
A key difﬁculty is that of the blurring of identities
that the Internet makes possible. In many ways, and for
many users, this is the beauty of the Web; however, the
requirements of security and such applications, as
e-commerce, require relatively stable identities. This
sort of trade-off is very hard to resolve (Lessig 1999;
O’Hara 2004, pp. 99–112).The M4L context will place a
very large number of constraints on this debate, not
always consistently. Privacy will be essential for the
promotion of trust; on the other hand, many of the uses
for large memory repositories will be leisure-based, and
may well require ﬂexibility to allow large numbers of
inexperienced users.
And to reiterate a debate in sociology and philos-
ophy alluded to in §2.2, how will the externalization of
memory, or the adding to our personal store a large
repository of externalized digital memories, affect our
identities as people, our human nature? Would such
accessorizing be empowering? Or merely evidence of
decline? On the level of society, will the heaping up of
information about the past replace history and promote
populist narratives (Lukacs 2005, pp. 192–199)? Or
could it be an important aid to forgiveness without the
moral compromise of forgetting shameful episodes in
the past (Margalit 2002, pp. 183–209)? What will the
relation be between the memory of the whole and that
of the individual? Does the collective have the right to
subpoena individuals’ memories? And how will equal
a c c e s s ,e i t h e ra su s e ro rc ontributor, be secured
(O’Hara & Stevens 2006)?
Potentially as important as preservation are the
issues of retention, selection and disposal, and the role
of forgetting in the transmission of digital memory.
Dodge and Kitchin (2005) have highlighted some of the
potential ethical issues of M4L in an era of pervasive
electronic recording of all human activity. They have
argued that forgetting should be an integral part of the
process of designing and implementing M4L systems, as
the information could be open to exploitation for
commercial beneﬁt or to abuse of civil liberties. They
propose that digital memory could mirror some of the
characteristics offorgetting in human memory listed by
Schacter (2001) to overcome these issues by ensuring a
sufﬁcient degree of imperfection, loss and error.
However, does digital memory needs to be less
effective in all circumstances or to mirror all the
random imperfections of human memory? It can be
argued that many of the concerns raised could be
addressed by existing memory institution techniques
for access control and retention schedules being applied
to digital memory and their transmission to others.
Professional practice in memory institutions employs a
number of procedures for access control to safeguard
privacy, conﬁdential or sensitive information which can
be applied to either material or digital memory. These
can include redaction (blackouts), time-activated
release and anomalization. Retention policies and
procedures, i.e. what to keep, for how long and where,
can also be used. Although it is technically possible to
capture and retain in its entirety a continuous data
stream for digital memory, there may be several reasons
including privacy to apply an approach of selective
retention. A formal transparent process for retention
will contribute to trust in the record, which will be
central to many potential applications of M4L and to its
value as an extension of human memory.
5. MEMORIES FOR LIFE: A GRAND CHALLENGE
The scientiﬁc and technological threads described
above are beginning to be drawn together. In particu-
lar, neuroscience and cognitive psychology are inﬂuen-
cing each other’s research agendas through cognitive
neuroscience; biologically inspired computing is becom-
ing increasingly mainstream; knowledge technologies
are exploiting insights from both computer science and
knowledge management; and current strands of social
science research such as neuroeconomics are suggestive
of important interdisciplinary arenas.
Right in the middle of this interdisciplinary mix is
the grand challenge of M4L. As computers become
increasingly able to store a lifetime’s worth of mem-
ories, in various forms—digital photographs, emails,
documents, accounts, blogs, video diaries—the ques-
tion of managing such stores is becoming serious. Such
management questions are typical of the corporate
world, but are rapidly entering the private space too.
In particular, if we take a conception of such
information stores as part of memory proper, out-
sourced to machines to be sure, but still adjuncts to the
human act of recall (in the way that written texts
became; Havelock 1963), then the challenge of M4L
takes shape. The interdisciplinary opportunity becomes
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memory, and its interaction with the environment, in
order to augment it with technological support. The
result of such a research programme, it is hoped, would
be better human use of artiﬁcial memory storage
and retrieval systems, and the smoother integration of
such systems into real lives.
The statement of the M4L research challenge
(Fitzgibbon & Reiter 2003) sets out many opportunities
for bringing these various sciences and technologies to
bear on human problems. The commercial implications
of bringing together science and technology in a
comprehensive way to deal with information through
its life cycle in both individual and corporate contexts
are likely to be dramatic. Furthermore, given that
memory is, in general, a more serious problem for more
marginalized communities (for instance, on the level of
the individual, the elderly; on the social level, ethnic
minorities), this is a real opportunity to apply
technology sympathetically to such groups.
Fitzgibbon & Reiter mention a number of challenges
that might fall under the M4L heading. Multimedia
searching is an obvious challenge, as a hard and
complex problem that will be central to most con-
ceivable applications, as noted above. A possible move
here would be to research the possibility of search of
multimedia repositories using examples or exemplars.
A research problem bringing together a wide range of
interests, is that of ‘stories from a life’. Given a set of
resources, how could one construct narratives around
them, integrating the different modalities that may be
present into a single seamless account—an account,
moreover, that may differ depending on the person to
whom it is presented? This is vital if we are to go
beyond the storage and retrieval of vast amounts of
unanalysed information. How do we understand the
context of stories? How do we know when two different
representations are of the same memory? How do we
know the assumptions that a listener will make about
what underlies a narrative? How do we know when a
narrative is achieving its purpose (e.g. retelling some
key event in a group’s history)? Work such as this will
be able to draw on applications for developing and
displaying narratives in differing contexts from a
variety of sources (Alani et al. 2003).
A third example from Fitzgibbon & Reiter is that of
providing prosthetic memories for those with memory
dysfunctions. Is it possible to analyse memories and
create a schedule for a typical day? Will it be possible to
monitor a person’s activities and help them through
their day, alerting carers when there is a signiﬁcant
deviation? How can we use our neuropsychological
knowledge of memory dysfunction to specify the types
of memory function to model (and can computing
methods replicate such memory types accurately
enough in real time)? Just how much memory could
be successfully and seamlessly externalized? Or, in a
more positive vein, will it be possible to develop models
to help create lifelong ‘companions’ or personal agents
to support, for example, one’s personal e-learning
proﬁle, or to monitor and record one’s health record?
The examples adduced here are relatively hetero-
geneous. Research in this area needs to be careful about
how tenuous are the metaphors that govern it
(cf. O’Hara et al. 2006, pp. 240–241), and how they
are stretched by usage. For example, forgetting in a
human is an unconscious thing, some sort of second-
order phenomenon the net result of which is an inability
to recall some knowledge or memory; in amachine itis a
ﬁrst-order phenomenon of deletion. Does that mean
that if we talk about forgetting in the cross-disciplinary
M4L context we are in danger of incoherence?
In a comment on Fitzgibbon & Reiter (2003), Sparck
Jones (2004) notes that there are a number of basic
distinctions that need to be observed in order to place
some coherence on the research area of M4L. One
distinction is ‘internal’ versus ‘external’, in other words
the commonsense distinction between something ‘in’
my mind and something public. Sparck Jones argues
that currently there is little or no technological access
to whatever is in my mind, and that the focus of M4L is
necessarily to the external. On the other hand, the sort
of anti-private language arguments made by the later
Wittgenstein may alert us to the requirement to recast
this distinction (Wittgenstein 1953). After all, on
Wittgenstein’s reading, there is nothing on the
‘internal’ side of this distinction anyway. A more
important distinction is that between the preservation
of memories for me, or for others, though even there
methods for extracting and preserving what seem to be
very personal memories sometimes have repercussions
for outside observers (for instance, oral history tries to
preserve very subjective experiences using idiosyncratic
representations, but the aim is to try to recreate for
history the experience of whatever is being recorded;
and also in this context cf. Wilks 2004).
Based on an examination of these distinctions,
Sparck Jones suggests ﬁve types of M4L project.
(i) SuperMe. A body of data that is an electronic
enhancement of my memory, data that can be
invoked to amplify events that I actually
remember (e.g. photographs, Powerpoint slides,
diary entries).The effect is somewhat prosthetic.
(ii) Deposit. A data repository of items that is
meaningful to me.
(iii) Persona. A data declaration by me for consump-
tion by others, a sort of public history of me
developed by me that I make available to others.
(iv) Assembly. Somewhat like Persona, but not
necessarily (entirely) under my control. An
example of an Assembly might be a doctor’s
medical record of me.
(v) Collective. A body of data associated with
different, though connected, people, such as a
corporate memory, a society’s archive or
museum, or even the World Wide Web.
There are, no doubt, other interpretations of M4L
logically available. For instance, one could imagine a
body of data meaningful to a subject, yet not under
control of the subject (a cross, then, between Deposit
and Assembly); this might be a set of records and cues
intended to help secure the coherence of daily life for
someone with a failing memory or a chaotic lifestyle. As
Sparck Jones points out, these different types of M4L
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standing and manipulation of the data, of the privacy
and trust issues, of representation requirements and so
on, and the examples of Fitzgibbon & Reiter (2003) are
distributed across these different types. On the other
hand, part of the M4L research challenge is to under-
stand methods of storage, retrieval and sensemaking
that will be important in preserving these large and
very possibly growing mountains of data, whose mean-
ingfulness depends to a very large extent on the context
(made up of the human memory with which they are
associated, the rest of the data in the repository and the
requirements of the repository’s users), which we can
expect to be highly heterogeneous in form, and which
may need to be retrieved by many different users.
Furthermore, we should not assume that the ﬁve types
of M4L that Sparck Jones has set out will be mutually
exclusive; it may be that the same data repository is
used for multiple purposes, or, perhaps more likely, as a
component in a number of different systems alongside
other repositories. The issue, as Sparck Jones suggests,
is whether generic data storage and retrieval techniques
exist that could be used in a series of applications such
as those suggested above, in such a way that they go
beyond technological ﬁxes, but genuinely import
insights from medical, biological and social sciences.
Focusing now on the ‘for life’ part of M4L, such generic
techniques should be capable of supporting repositories
or memories for far longer periods of time than we
currently typically envisage. After all, at the time of
writing the entire history of computing is somewhat less
than a normal human lifetime.
Technically, the challenges are enormous. For
example, open data structures would allow assembled
data to outlast the systems that generated and stored
them, which could be a boon in this context. Indexing
strategies must be ﬂexible enough to allow new sets of
unpredicted questions to be asked. How do we develop
interfaces that maximize access for the non-computer
literate?
One immediate issue of great importance is the
development of a set of working data that can help
deﬁne a problem space, act as a testbed for
particular approaches, while also facilitating compari-
sons (Fitzgibbon & Reiter 2003). Such data should not
have been processed signiﬁcantly, of course, for this
would import too many assumptions about formats and
purposes to allow for the pursuit of genericity, or to
support genuine research about technological possibi-
lities far into the future. The media of the data may be
veryheterogeneous,butsomeofitneedstobeprettyraw.
Such are the complexities of the technological issues
here—not merely in technological development, though
those are hard enough, but also with respect to
situating technology within recognizably human and
social contexts—that M4L has been selected as one of
the United Kingdom Computing Research Commit-
tee’s (UKCRC) Grand Challenges. The UKCRC is a
joint committee of the British Computing Society and
the Institute of Electrical Engineers, and has sponsored
a series of challenges the pursuit of which will
enhance and focus future computing research (http://
www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand_challenges/index.cfm). The
criteria for selection as a grand challenge are that (i)
the challenge has international scope, (ii) its ambition
exceeds that of a single research group or single
grant, (iii) it should promise revolutionary rather
than evolutionary advance and (iv) there should be
a consensus within the scientiﬁc community that the
research goal will be interesting and fruitful (cf.
Fitzgibbon & Reiter 2003). Furthermore, the British
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
has sponsored a network called M4L in order to take the
short-term steps to begin to engineer a multi-disciplin-
ary community of scientists willing to work together to
attempt to implement the M4L challenge (http://www.
memoriesforlife.org/). The M4L network has set up a
working group to investigate the possibilities for
securing testbed data.
Forecasts about future technological develop-
ments are fraught with pitfalls, needless to say,
and Fitzgibbon & Reiter’s account is meant to be no
more than suggestive of opportunity. But the
examples given, and the general understanding of
the signiﬁcance of the blurring of the physical and
the digital worlds, make it clear that there is a
problem space emerging where all the disciplines
discussed in this paper, and doubtless many more,
will be able to contribute.
It is, of course, a moot question as to how much
genuine interdisciplinary collaboration could emerge in
pursuing a vision of the augmentation of human
memory using open-ended technologies. We have
already reviewed the state of the art in various
disciplines’ study of memory (see also Morris et al.
2006b), and seen how close a genuine problem space is.
For instance, different types of human memory, and
their neurological implementations, are suggestive to
computer science, not only for the purposes of imita-
tion, but also to ﬁnd artiﬁcial memory functions that
complement human function. Sociological research is
beginning to tell us how memory ﬁts into social
behaviour, how social memories are constructed and
which memories it is therefore important to preserve. In
more formal social structures, knowledge management
and organizational science are telling us more or less the
same things, while providing an important inﬂuence on
technological development. It is impossible to predict
which developments will be the most far-reaching, but
we might venture to hope that many developments will
improve the lot of both individuals and communities.
6. CONCLUSION
In a celebrated essay on the new electronic media,
Marshall McLuhan wrote in 1962:
Our private senses are not closed systems but are
endlessly translated into each other in that experience
which we call consciousness. Our extended senses,
tools, technologies, through the ages, have been closed
systems incapable of interplay or collective awareness.
Now, in the electric age, the very instantaneous nature
of co-existence among our technological instruments
has created a crisis quite new in human history. Our
extended faculties and senses now constitute a single
ﬁeld of experience which demands that they become
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private senses, now demand an interplay and ratio
that makes rational co-existence possible. As long as
our technologies were as slow as the wheel or the
alphabet or money, the fact that they were separate,
closed systems was socially and psychically supporta-
ble. This is not true now when sight and sound and
movement are simultaneous and global in extent.
(McLuhan 1962, p. 5, emphasis in original)
Over 40 years later, the seamless interplay that
McLuhan demanded between our technologies is still
barely visible. McLuhan’s predictions of the spread,
and increased importance, of electronic media have of
course been borne out, but the open systems that he
called for remain on the drawing board. Part of the
problem is that technology has all too often been
inserted in social situations without a thought about
how people could interact with it, as many commenta-
tors, not only those critical of science and technology,
have pointed out.
The M4L challenge has the potential to bring
together the fascinating results from various disciplines
that we described above. At a minimum, it promises to
provide a common problem space to promote the
interdisciplinary integration that would in itself be a
beneﬁt. At best, the understanding of the social
context, the possibilities and limits of human capacities
and the sensitive application of powerful technologies
could revolutionize both our understanding of memory
and our effectiveness as agents.
The role of learned societies, such as the Royal
Society, or the British Computer Society, in assessing
these questions, and in communicating scientiﬁc and
technological advance to stakeholders, is clearly key
here. The M4L programme will need scientiﬁc infra-
structural support, as interdisciplinary collaboration
can be hard, both in terms of achieving commonality of
viewbetweencollaborators,andwithrespecttofunding.
Naturally, funding bodies and university departments
are organized along disciplinary lines. Near-market
products can tap into resources from the private sector,
but ex hypothesi M4L is not at that stage yet.
This paper, whose authors are drawn from the ﬁelds
of computer science, cognitive psychology, neuro-
science and information science, has developed over a
long period as a result of a series of reports written for
the UK Government’s Cognitive Systems Foresight
programme (Morris et al. 2006b), which enabled the
authors to identify potential synergies and areas where
research from different disciplines would dovetail. Such
juxtaposition of scientists is important for spotting
opportunities; it is to be hoped that a challenge such as
M4L could provide a focus for funding bodies, scientists
and industry to work together effectively in pursuit of
the science of memory and the technology of infor-
mation storage and retrieval.
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